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ARTICLES
DUE DILIGENCEAS A TWO-EDGED SWORD:
POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF VENTURE
CAPITALISTS FUNDING HIGH-TECH
START-UPS
by James J. Marcellino
Dexter L. Kenfield*
I. INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions in the United States, trade secret law is
grounded in tort principles.1 Trade secret law is intended both to
maintain commercial morality and to encourage research and inno-
vation by affording protection to trade secrets.2 These twin objec-
tives are often at variance with each other and with other strong
public policies. For example, there is a strong emphasis on the en-
couragement of competition3 and the free and relatively unfettered
exchange of information, even commercial information, so that the
public will not be deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patent-
able, inventions.4 Moreover, as a matter of public policy, individu-
als are encouraged to utilize, to the maximum extent possible, their
Copyright @ 1986 James J. Marcellino and Dexter Kenfield. All Rights Reserved.
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M.B.A. from Boston University Graduate School of Management. Mr. Kenfield has a B.S.
from the University of Vermont, and he received a J.D. in 1980 from Harvard Law School.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Thomas E. Kanwit, an associate at
Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors
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1. See generally MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (various portions of comment b to
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) have been cited with approval in 29 jurisdictions);
JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW HANDBOOK § 3.01 (RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 has be-
come an almost universal starting point for defining the rights and liabilities of the parties in
trade secret cases), and § 4.01[2].
2. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974).
3. Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 76 Il1.2d 475, 207 U.S.P.Q. 1039, 1041
(1980).
4. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
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general knowledge, skill and experience in earning a living.5 In the
same vein, mobility in the employment marketplace is encouraged.6
Throughout the country, state and local governments have ac-
tively engaged in programs to stimulate the development of high-
technology businesses.7 The assistance provided may include low-
interest loans or other "seed" financing.' Most of the capital in-
vested in start-up and emerging high-technology companies, how-
ever, is provided by venture capital firms.' These firms, together
with their principals, may be sued in litigation involving alleged
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information used
by the financed companies."0 In fact, we expect that venture firms
will be named as additional defendants in many future actions."
Aggrieved possessors of trade secrets and their counsel may take
advantage of existing legal theories developed in analogous situa-
tions, may bring before the court a "deep pocket" defendant able to
respond in damages, and may create a tactical business advantage
by naming venture capital firms as additional defendants. Proper
resolution of these actions necessarily will require close analysis and
a careful balancing of the competing public policies on which trade
secret law is grounded.
This article will present a typical case and possible theories of
liability which may be advanced against venture firms that provide
funds to start-up and emerging high-technology companies. Of par-
ticular concern will be venture firms that invest in companies
5. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 200 A.2d
428, 437 (Del. Ch. 1964).
6. Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. Super Ct. 1960). See MILGRIM, supra
note 1, at n. 62.
7. For example, the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, an in-
dependent public agency, was formed in 1978 to promote early stage, high risk technology-
based companies in Massachusetts. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40G, § 1 et seq.(West 1979).
8. Seed financing is the initial financing from outside sources and is typically used to
fund operations in the first few months of the new venture, or for a limited purpose such as
composing a detailed business plan or conducting a comprehensive market analysis.
9. The VENTURE CAPITAL JOURNAL, in a May, 1985 Special Report, estimates that
venture capital investments in the five year period from 1980 to 1984 were 10.1 billion dol-
lars, with the heaviest investment in technology-based industries. Approximately 34% of the
estimated 3 billion dollars invested in 1984 was for seed, start-up and other early stage
financings.
10. In March 1983, IBM sued Cybernex, Inc. and two venture capital firms in an action
entitled IBM v. Cybernex, No. C-83-1277RPA-SJ (N.D. Cal. filed March 1983), in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. IBM also named as
defendants two employees of the venture capital firms who serve on the Board of Directors of
Cybernex. The action has not yet proceeded to a trial.
11. We have been unable to find any reported decisions dealing directly with the liabil-
ity of a venture capital firm in situations like the one presented here. Accordingly, we will
draw upon case law and commentary in analogous situations.
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founded by former employees of the company asserting, as plaintiff,
the alleged misappropriation, and how the venture firms' due dili-
gence might be used against them. Finally, we will recommend a
legal standard of liability against venture capital firms in these
situations.
II. THE PROTOTYPICAL CASE
The issues discussed in this article can arise in a wide variety of
factual settings. They can be illustrated, however, with a single,
prototypical fact situation.12 Close variants of this situation will
represent most situations in which these matters will arise.
Alphabetics Corporation is the industry leader in the develop-
ment of computer software for artificial language work. As the
world has gradually come to realize that government bureaucrats
will never be able to utilize English or any other human language,
focus has shifted to the development of artificial languages for use
specifically by government agencies. Alphabetics marketed the first
computer system for the automatic generation of government re-
ports in a new artificial language, all but incomprehensible to the
general public. It has thus pioneered a largely untapped and poten-
tially lucrative market.
Bob Basic and Carol Cobol were high-level programmers for
Alphabetics. They designed and supervised the development of the
new Alphabetics system, and wrote much of the computer code.
Dan Doolittle was the marketing manager for the project. He per-
formed the market research which convinced Alphabetics of the po-
tential for the new market, organized the marketing program,
assembled the sales force, and actually made the first sale. Dan is
without question the most knowledgeable person in the country
with respect to this market. All three have worked for Alphabetics
for ten years, since graduation from their respective college or post-
graduate institutions.
Early in the artificial language project, Alphabetics decided,
against the advice of Bob, Carol and Dan, that the Alphabetics sys-
tem would be designed as a hardware/software system, with new
hardware dedicated and designed solely for this application. As the
project lagged, they became increasingly disenchanted, convinced
that a better and quicker course would be to produce software to
run on existing general purpose computers. They also believed that
12. The facts presented and the names used do not reflect an actual case and are not
intended to identify any companies or individuals.
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a smaller, more streamlined company could produce better quality,
more efficient and more error-free programming. As the first Al-
phabetics system was about to be shipped to a customer, they began
discussing among themselves the possibility of setting up a new
business to compete with Alphabetics. They began to draft business
plans. Two months later, the three resigned their employment on
the same day and organized Elfspeak, Inc. Two weeks later, they
appeared at the office of Fantastic Ventures, a venture capital firm,
organized as a limited partnership with an emphasis on computer-
related companies.
After a few weeks of negotiations, Elfspeak and Fantastic Ven-
tures executed a term sheet13 describing the terms of prospective
investment by Fantastic Ventures. The term sheet was subject to
final documentation, and completion of Fantastic Ventures' due dil-
igence.' 4 Several weeks later, the due diligence was completed, the
financing documentation was executed, and Fantastic Ventures be-
came a major equity participant in the new venture.
Two weeks later, Alphabetics filed an action seeking a tempo-
rary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief,
damages, and attorneys' fees. The defendants named were Bob
Basic, Carol Cobol, Dan Doolittle, Elfspeak, Fantastic Ventures
and George Gopher, the general partner of Fantastic Ventures. The
complaint alleged that the new venture was based upon the wrong-
ful use and disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information
of Alphabetics; that the former employees violated their contracts
with and fiduciary and loyalty duties to Alphabetics; that the pro-
posed Elfspeak product will, and to the extent it already exists, does
infringe Alphabetics' copyrights and other proprietary rights; that
the Elfspeak venture constitutes the misappropriation of a corporate
opportunity of Alphabetics; and that Fantastic Ventures and Go-
pher induced, aided, abetted, participated in and stand to benefit
from all of the foregoing. 5 Legal claims were asserted based upon
common law and numerous federal and state statutes. If successful,
Alphabetics may be entitled to treble damages, attorneys' fees, and
possibly punitive damages, in addition to any injunctive relief which
may be afforded.
13. See infra Part III for the definition and discussion of a term sheet.
14. See infra Part IV for the definition and discussion of due diligence.
15. We will focus here only on the alleged common law misappropriation of trade se-
cret and confidential information.
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III. THE TERM SHEET
As will be seen, the term sheet will provide critical foundation
for the arguments by which Alphabetics will seek to impose liability
on Fantastic Ventures. 16 Accordingly, the function, nature and
content of the Elfspeak term sheet must be considered in detail.
A term sheet is the typical first step in the process of obtaining
venture capital funding for a new enterprise. In form, it is a brief
outline of the basic terms under which the venture capitalist may be
willing to provide funds to the venture. It is typically contingent on
the completion of due diligence; other contingencies may be in-
cluded as well.
The primary terms involve the amount of money to be in-
vested, and the extent and nature of participation in the corporation
which the venture capitalist will receive in return. In the simplest
situation, the venture capitalist merely buys a given number of
shares of common stock. More commonly, the venture capitalist is
also entitled to certain preferential rights as to dividends, liquida-
tion, and other matters, and is also entitled to representation on the
board of directors.Very often, the financing is accomplished in a series of phases.
Each phase is contingent upon the company's meeting specific mile-
stones of achievement following prior phases, and each phased in-
vestment may be optional on the part of the venture capitalist.
There may be some circumstances under which the company can
force additional financing, and other contingencies may be provided
for. For example, if a milestone is not met, the company might be
obligated to arrange other equity or debt financing before the ven-
ture firm must make a further investment.
The term sheet may contemplate and broadly describe collat-
eral agreements which the venture capitalist may require, such as
shareholder voting agreements or anti-dilution agreements. 7 The
term sheet may also require that the company obtain longterm em-
ployment contracts, non-competition agreements and nondisclo-
16. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the liability of Gopher other than as
he is the general partner of Fantastic Ventures. But see Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587
F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (under ordinary principles of unfair competition participating
officers and directors may be personally liable).
17. Anti-dilution agreements provide protection to investors against later issuance of
common stock or securities convertible or exercisable into common stock, where the issue,
conversion, or exercise price of the later issue is below the price stipulated in the earlier
security or below the market price. 2 HAFT, VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL BUSINESS
FINANCINGS, § 1.03[4] (1985); Kaplan, Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution
Clauses in Convertible Securities, 33 UNIV. CHICAGO L. R. 1 (1965).
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sure/assignment of invention agreements from key employees, and
that the company either engage or refrain from engaging in various
other activities. Although an attempt is made in the term sheet to
set forth the critical terms of the financing, there is no effort made
to set forth a complete and enforceable financing contract; that ef-
fort is made only near or at the completion of due diligence.
In our prototypical case, the founders, Bob, Carol and Dan,
initially proposed to sell twenty-five percent of the common stock of
Elfspeak to Fantastic Ventures in exchange for $250,000. Elfspeak
had already been incorporated in the founders' home state, and
Bob, Carol and Dan had each been issued 250 shares of the 1,000
shares authorized in the standard, short form articles of
incorporation.
Gopher thereupon began a process of educating the founders
as to the financial requirements of a start-up company, as well as
the general practice in venture financing. Within a matter of weeks,
agreement was reached on the term sheet. It provided for immedi-
ate investment of $250,000 in exchange for twenty-eight percent of
the common stock, each founder to hold twenty-four percent. It
provided for two of the five directors to be nominated by Fantastic
Ventures. Should Elfspeak reach the beta test phase 18 for its new
product within six months, the second phase of financing will be
provided, under which Fantastic Ventures will pay $500,000 for
500,000 shares of convertible preferred stock. Should the beta test
phase be reached in five months, Elfspeak may elect to force the
$500,000 investment at that time, in exchange for common stock
rather than convertible preferred. Should the company actually sell
its product to two customers within one year, Fantastic Ventures is
required to invest an additional one million dollars in exchange for
one million shares of convertible preferred stock. Fantastic Ven-
tures was granted the right to veto any major transaction, including
reorganization, or sale of assets or stock. In the event Elfspeak de-
faults in any of its obligations, Fantastic Ventures is entitled to re-
place all directors with its own nominees. Fantastic Ventures was
also granted a right of first refusal with respect to any acquisition of
the company or its product line, and was granted participation
rights in any public offering of securities of Elfspeak.
In order to permit these transactions, Elfspeak was reincorpo-
rated as a Delaware corporation, under articles of incorporation
18. Beta tests are operational product tests conducted at end user sites using actual as
opposed to simulated data. Alpha tests precede beta tests and are conducted by the manufac-
turer at its facilities with simulated data.
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drafted by Fantastic Ventures' counsel. On Gopher's recommenda-
tion, Elfspeak retained new corporate counsel. The founders met
with new counsel for the first time one week before the lawsuit was
filed.
IV. DUE DILIGENCE
The due diligence performed by Fantastic Ventures will form
an additional key link in Alphabetics' proof at trial. It must there-
fore be described in detail.
The term "due diligence" is familiar to attorneys who engage
in major securities transactions, such as the initial public offering of
stock in a company. In that connection, the term applies primarily
to lawyers, referring to the vast amount of legal "tire kicking"
which must be done, including a rather broad factual investigation
with respect to the company's business and financial position.
The term "due diligence" itself is derived from the so-called
"due diligence defense" available under section 11(e) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933.19 Although section 11 imposes liability upon a
wide range of individuals and entities (e.g., directors, underwriters
and counsel) for material errors or omissions from prospectuses or
other such documents in a public offering, a defense is generally
available, except for the issuer itself, only to those who "had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable grounds to believe and did be-
lieve" that the offering materials were accurate and complete.
The term in practice has come to have a broader meaning, in-
cluding not only the investigation of a securities issuer by under-
writers and counsel, but also the broader business and financial
investigations and considerations of a prospective investor in almost
any enterprise. It is this broader sense in which the term is used
here.
Accordingly, in the venture capital context, "due diligence" re-
fers to the process conducted by a venture capital firm prior to mak-
ing a final decision regarding whether or not to invest in a particular
enterprise.20 Whereas the securities due diligence can be character-
ized as a search for facts of legal significance in order to establish
compliance with legal requirements, the venture capital due dili-
gence is a search for facts, with business or financial significance, in
order to determine the "fit" of the proposed venture with the ven-
19. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 426 U.S. 185, 208 (1976).
20. 2 HAFT, VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCINGS § 6.01-6.11
(1985); Case, An Overview of Venture Capital, in START-UP COMPANIES § 6.04 (1985); Salz-
man and Doerr, The Venture Financing Process, in START-UP COMPANIES § 7.04[4] (1985).
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ture capital firm's own policies and objectives. (This is not to say
that legal aspects are irrelevant, as pointed out below.)
Broadly speaking, the venture capitalist seeks to evaluate three
factors: the people, the proposed product, and the market. Specifi-
cally, a venture capital firm's due diligence focuses on independent
verification of claims made by the entity seeking financing, as well
as investigation of the individuals involved. The starting point typi-
cally is information provided by the venture's founders, either in a
business plan or through personal interviews. This will include
background information on the proposed product and its market,
the experience and background of the individuals involved, provi-
sion of some data concerning the underlying market, and the provi-
sion of market and personal references.
Working from this raw data, the venture capitalist can begin its
due diligence. Market references will be contacted and, within a
shield of confidentiality, the proposed venture will be discussed.
Market data provided by the new venture will be checked for accu-
racy by the venture capitalist, and additional market research or
surveys may be conducted. The venture capitalist may retain
outside consultants for the purpose of providing marketing informa-
tion, or verifying or supplementing information provided by the
venture. Personal references will be contacted with a view to evalu-
ating the likely success of the individuals as entrepreneurs. In addi-
tion, where the venture capitalist has prior experience in the
particular industry involved, that experience will be brought to bear
upon evaluating the potential for success of the new venture. Each
of these steps, of course, may produce further leads and the devel-
opment of additional sources and information requiring investiga-
tion by the venture capitalist.
Throughout the due diligence process, the venture capitalist is
also in close contact with its counsel. Any confidentiality, noncom-
petition or other agreements which may be relevant will be ex-
amined. Counsel for the venture firm may directly interview the
founders of the new venture. Counsel will investigate and consider
the likelihood and strength of claims by former employers, competi-
tors or others which may hinder or block the new venture. Counsel
may have some role in the venture firm's consideration of the gen-
eral character and reputation of the principals of the venture.2 1 Fi-
21. More than one venture capital firm has been "burned" either because it failed to ask
the right questions, or because it failed to recognize the legal significance of the answers it
received. Assistance of counsel can be invaluable in both areas. In addition, both the venture
firm and its counsel must recognize the inherent risk that the principals, whether as a result
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nally, counsel must prepare and/or review all documentation
concerning the proposed financing, bearing in mind corporate and
securities law requirements, potential litigation and other legal
matters.
At the conclusion of the due diligence process, the venture cap-
italist, advised by counsel, is in a position to make a final decision
on funding the venture. If the decision is to go ahead, then a closing
is scheduled at which the final documents are executed. Only at or
after the closing does the venture capitalist actually invest and be-
come a formal participant in the new venture.
In our prototypical case, the founders, Bob, Carol, and Dan,
provided a number of market and personal references to Gopher,
including customers and potential customers with whom they had
dealt while employed by Alphabetics. These references told Gopher
that the founders were the key personnel to the success of the Al-
phabetics product. They were universally described as hard-driv-
ing, "take charge" individuals highly likely to succeed in an
entrepreneurial environment, without regard to obstacles which
might be thrown in their paths. They were described as being ex-
ceptionally bright, and able to keep all necessary information and
decision factors in their heads without the need to refer constantly
to backup documentation.
Gopher, on behalf of Fantastic Ventures, retained an independ-
ent consultant who told him that the new Alphabetics product was
opening up an entirely new market, but that once the existence of
the market was firmly proven, many large computer companies
would rapidly enter it. Accordingly, in the consultant's opinion,
there was only a narrow window of opportunity; the new venture
would be highly likely to succeed if and only if it introduced a prod-
uct within the next eight to twelve months.
The due diligence revealed that the former Alphabetics em-
ployees, Bob, Carol and Dan, had no written noncompetition agree-
ments with Alphabetics, but each had signed a standard employee
confidentiality/assignment of invention agreement.22 They in-
of inexperience, legal naivete or simple human nature, may be less than fully candid and
forthcoming. We are unable to provide any definitive solution to this problem.
22. A typical Employee Patent and Confidential Information Agreement may provide:
"At no time either during his employment, on either a part or full-time basis
with the Company or subsequent to termination of such employment will Em-
ployee divulge to any person, firm or corporation, or use (other than as re-
quired by the Company in the course of his employment) any privileged or
confidential information, trade secret or other proprietary information includ-
ing, but not limited to, information relating to the experimental and research
1986]
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formed Gopher and Fantastic Ventures' counsel that they had
taken no documents or other Alphabetics materials with them when
they left the company. Upon the suggestion of Fantastic Ventures'
counsel, Gopher had each employee sign a separate document rep-
resenting that to the best of his or her knowledge, information and
belief, he or she was not, and no planned activities of Elfspeak
would place him or her, in violation of any employment, confidenti-
ality or other agreement with Alphabetics.
On the basis of its due diligence, Fantastic Ventures proceeded
with the financing.
V. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Trade Secrets
The Restatement of Torts section 757, sets forth the generally
recognized common law rule for misappropriation of trade
secrets:
23
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privi-
lege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret
by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the
secret to him, or (c) he learned the secret from a third person
with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third
person discovered it by improper means or that the third person's
disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a
secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake24 (em-
phasis added).
In the employment context, most courts have recognized that a
confidential relationship exists between an employer and an em-
ployee.25 The general rule is that:
'[iln a situation where there has been no express contract of an
work of the Corporation, its methods, processes, tools, machinery, formulae,
drawings, or appliances imparted or divulged to, gained or developed by or
otherwise discovered by Employee during his employment with the
Company."
Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F.
Supp. 1102, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
23. In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recom-
mended the enactment of a Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1979). That Act has
been adopted in 9 states. Although there are differences, the Act closely tracks the Restate-
ment of Torts approach.
24. We will focus on subparagraph (c) and those situations where the initial disclosure
was made to the employees in a lawful manner and discovery was not by improper means.
25. MILGRIM, supra note I, at § 5.02(1].
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employee not to use or disclose confidential information en-
trusted to him during his employment,... although an employee
may carry away and use general skill or knowledge acquired dur-
ing the course of his employment, he may be enjoined from using
or disclosing confidential information so acquired.' . . .The
above stated rule is based upon 'basic' principles of equity...
and upon an implied contract, growing out of the nature of the
employer-employee relation 26 (emphasis added).
To the extent that the venture capital firm, in its due diligence,
learns that the former employees, now principals of the new com-
pany, disclosed or used a trade secret in the business of the new
company in breach of their duty to their former employer, the ven-
ture firm may also be liable to the possessor of the trade secret
under section 757.
Comment (c) to section 757 specifically states that one has no-
tice of facts under the rule stated in the section when he knows of
them or when he should know of them, citing to the Restatement of
Trusts section 297:
He should know of them if, from the information which he has, a
reasonable man would infer the facts in question, or if, under the
circumstances, a reasonable man would be put on inquiry and an
inquiry pursued with reasonable intelligence and diligence would
disclose the facts.
In addition, the comment makes specific reference to notification of
a fact. The comment refers to the Restatement of Agency section 9,
wherein a person is given notification of a fact by another if the
latter informs him of the fact "or of other facts from which he has
reason to know or should know the fact."
28
Section 758 of the Restatement of Torts deals with the inno-
26. Jet Spray Cooler v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 825, 839, 282 N.E.2d 921, 924 (1972),
quoting New England Overall Co., Inc. v. Woltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 75, 176 N.E.2d 193, 198
(1961), and citing Aronson v. Orlon, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 952-3 (1917). See also
MILGRIM, supra note 1, at § 4.02. Here, Bob, Carol, and Dan have signed express agree-
ments regarding their obligation to maintain confidence.
27. See Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(a reasonable man would be aware that certain disclosures were a breach of the confidential
relationship between employer and employee).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1965) defines "reason to know" and
"should know." The comment to § 12 notes that the two phrases differ:
in that 'reason to know' implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor
whereas 'should know' implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascer-
taining the fact in question... 'Should know' indicates that the actor is under
a duty to another to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the existence or non-
existence of the fact in question and that he would ascertain the existence
thereof in the proper performance of that duty.
1986]
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cent discovery of a secret and the effect of subsequent notice and
change in position by the recipient of the secret:
One who learns another's trade secret from a third person with-
out notice that it is secret and that the third person's disclosure is
a breach of his duty to the other, or who learns the secret
through a mistake without notice of the secrecy and the mistake,
(a) is not liable to the other for a disclosure or use of the
secret prior to receipt of such notice, and
(b) is liable to the other for a disclosure or use of the secret
after the receipt of such notice, unless prior thereto he has in
good faith paid value for the secret or has so changed his
position that to subject him to liability would be
inequitable.29
The issue, then, is whether the venture firm had notice of the
facts (1) that the subject information was a secret and (2) that the
former employees breached their duty to their former employer in
disclosing or using the trade secret. As a practical matter, the two
prongs may collapse into a single inquiry; it is difficult to imagine a
high-technology, start-up company which rightfully uses another's
trade secrets or confidential information.
B. Joint or Contributing Tortfeasor3 °
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 875 sets forth the
general rule for contributing tortfeasors.
Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal
cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party is sub-
ject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm.31
Indeed, as one court noted, the general rule is that "[o]ne who
knowingly participates in or joins in an enterprise whereby a viola-
tion of a fiduciary obligation is effected, is liable jointly and sever-
ally with the recreant fiduciary."32
The comment also notes that the phrases are used in the same sense as they are used in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 (1957).
29. See Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 155 (Pa. Super. 1980).
30. The term "joint tortfeasor" has been taken to mean two or more persons united in
committing a tort, or whose acts or omissions concur and contribute to and produce a single
indivisible injury to a third person. See BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, (3d ed. 1969).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). We discern no relevant
difference between a "joint tortfeasor" and a "contributing tortfeasor," and use these terms
interchangeably.
31. Whether civil conspiracy is a substantive tort is beyond the scope of this article. See
generally Note, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort, 59 B.U.L. REV. 921 (1979).
32. Oil & Gas Ventures - First 1958 Fund LTD. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), cited with approval in Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The Restatement (Second) of Agency section 312, states that:
"[A] person who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally
causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his principal, is subject
to liability to the principal." Comment (c) to section 312 states that
"[A] person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his
duty to this principal, received confidential information from the
agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it and required to hold prof-
its received by its use as a constructive trustee. '3 3 Accordingly, a
venture firm may be liable for misappropriation as a joint or con-
tributing tortfeasor.
C. Aiding and Abetting
The venture capital firm may also be liable on an aiding and
abetting theory of liability. As noted in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 876, liability attaches, as an aider and abettor, for
tortious conduct of another if the person "knows that the other's
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself." Under the
Restatement standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements
in order to impose aider and abettor liability: (1) a breach of fiduci-
ary duty; (2) knowledge of this wrongdoing by the defendant; and
(3) substantial assistance or encouragement provided by the
defendant.
In Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness,34 the court was con-
fronted with plaintiff's claim that certain trustees of a real estate
investment trust were liable on an aiding and abetting theory as a
result of the sale of real property to them, allegedly in violation of
the seller's fiduciary duties and declaration of trust. In rejecting the
plaintiff's claim, the court held that actual knowledge of a breach of
duty is required; mere suspicion or even recklessness as to the exist-
ence of a breach is insufficient, citing, among other authority, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876, comment (b).3 1 In con-
cluding that defendants' recklessness was insufficient to establish
the element of knowledge, the Barness court distinguished between
reckless conduct as a form of knowing conduct in the context of
33. In Armenian Hotel Owners, Inc. v. Kulhanjian, 96 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1957), the
court, while concluding that the evidence showed a "guilty participation" by the defendant in
a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff corporation of its principal asset, held that the defendant
was accountable as a constructive trustee, citing the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 314
(1933). The defendant was not jointly liable, however, for the "damages" assessed against the
co-conspirators.
34. 611 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
35. Id. at 1027.
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misrepresentation and the imposition of secondary aider and abet-
tor liability for one's role as a purchaser in an alleged tortious sales
transaction.36 The Barness court also noted that the plaintiff had
cited no cases, nor could the court locate any, that imposed or even
considered a claim of aider and abettor liability on a showing of less
than actual knowledge of wrongdoing in circumstances like those
presented.37
Comment (b) to section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts sets forth the factors for evaluating the degree of assistance
required as the third element for finding liability for aiding and
abetting:
The assistance of or participation by the defendant may be so
slight that he is not liable for the act of the other. In determining
this, the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance
given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the
tort, his relation to the other and his state of mind are all
considered.38
The issue of aider and abettor liability often arises in the securi-
ties area. In S.E.C. v. Coffey, the court set forth the elements of
liability for aiding and abetting:
Without meaning to set forth an inflexible definition of aiding
and abetting, we find that a person may be held as an aider and
abettor only if some other party has committed a securities law
violation, if the accused party had general awareness that his role
was part of an overall activity that is improper, and if the ac-
cused aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the
violation.39
In determining whether reckless conduct generally will satisfy
the scienter4° requirement of Rule lOb-5 under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the court in Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill,
Inc.4 1 noted that:
36. Id. at 1027, n. 37.
37. Id. Also, the burden of demonstrating actual knowledge is a heavy one especially
where the alleged aider and abettor owes no fiduciary duty to, or has no confidential relation-
ship with, the injured party. Cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975);
H.L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332, 1336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
38. See also Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, First Pennsylvania Bank N.A. v. Monsen, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
39. 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). See also
Admiralty Funds v. Tabor, 677 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. The term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976).
41. 537 F. Supp. 730, 743 (W.D. Va. 1982), quoting Woodward v. Metro. Bank of
Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975), in turn quoting Ruder, Multiple Defendants and
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If all that is required in order to impose liability for aiding and
abetting is that illegal activity under the securities laws exists and
that a secondary defendant, such as a bank, gave aid to that ille-
gal activity, the act of loaning funds to the market manipulator
would clearly fall within that category and would expose the
bank to liability for aiding and abetting. Imposition of such lia-
bility on banks would virtually make them insurers regarding the
conduct of insiders to whom they loan money. If it is assumed
that an illegal scheme existed and that the bank's loan or other
activity provided assistance to that scheme, some remaining dis-
tinguishing factor must be found in order to prevent such auto-
matic liability. The bank's knowledge of the illegal scheme at the
time it loaned the money or agreed to loan the money provides
that additional factor. Knowledge of wrongful purpose thus be-
comes a crucial element in aiding and abetting or conspiracy
cases.
The United States Supreme Court, in Dirks v. SEC,42 in discussing
the derivative liability of an outsider who is alleged to have passed
on insider information to others who thereafter trade on that infor-
mation, noted that:
... a tippee [outsider] assumes a fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic informa-
tion only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.43
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification
and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 630-31 (1972).
42. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
43. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. Further, the Court made specific reference to the knowledge
requirement as follows:
Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of restitution
that '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communi-
cates confidential information to a third person, the third person, if he had
notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the benefici-
ary any profit which he makes through the use of such information.' 3 L.
Loss, SECURrrIES REGULATION 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities likewise have expressed
the view that tippee liability exists only where there has been a breach of trust
by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. See, eg., Ross v. Licht, 263
F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5,
§ 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("IThe better view is that a tipper must know or have
reason to know the information is nonpublic and was improperly obtained.");
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The
extension of Rule lOb-5 restrictions to tippees of corporate insiders can best be
justified on the theory that they are participating in the insider's breach of his
fiduciary duty.") Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 comment c
(1958) ("A person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty
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In denying an in pari delicto defense in a lOb-5 action, the
United States Supreme Court, in Batement Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner,' reviewed a tippee's derivative liability and noted
that "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his
role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduci-
ary duty" toward corporate shareholders.45
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed
some doubt about aiding and abetting and other "add-on" theories
of liability under the Securities Act,46 the securities law cases stand
for the proposition that to find secondary liability on an aiding and
abetting theory, there must be actual knowledge and that knowl-
edge must be knowledge not only of the underlying facts, but of the
unlawful purpose.4 7 Those requirements stem from the common
law element of aiding and abetting a fraud as expressed in section
876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4"
As noted in Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., to
satisfy the knowledge requirement:
: . . the proof offered must establish conscious involvement in
impropriety or constructive notice of intended impropriety ....
Such involvement may be demonstrated by proof that the alleged
aider-abettor was generally aware that his role was part of an
overall activity that was improper.49
Finally, section 297 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts pro-
vides a multi-factor test for determining whether a party should
have known of another's breach of trust:
Among the circumstances which are or may be of importance are
the following: (1) whether he knows that the person with whom
he is dealing is in fact a trustee; (2) the extent to which he has
reason to believe that the person with whom he is dealing is or
may be a trustee; (3) the character of the property dealt with,
whether it is land or a chattel or a chose in action, negotiable or
non-negotiable; (4) whether the transaction is one in the ordinary
to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may be
[deemed] ... a constructive trustee.") Id. at 660, n.20.
44. 53 U.S.L.W. 4737, (U.S. June 11, 1985).
45. Id. at 4741, quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230, n.12 (1980).
46. Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311, n.12 (9th Cir. 1982),
referring to Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69
CALIF. L. REv. 80 (1981).
47. We are not here concerned with situations in which there is a fiduciary duty owed
by the alleged aider and abettor to the injured party, or in which a confidential relationship
exists between them.
48. Keller v. Coyle, 499 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
49. Monsen, supra note 38, at 799.
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course of the business of the trustee; (5) whether the trustee is
disposing of the property for much less than its real value; (6)
whether the third person knows or has reason to believe that the
trustee is dealing with the property for his own benefit; (7)
whether the third person is purchasing the property or engaging
in some other transaction with the trustee.
VI. DUE DILIGENCE: THE Two-EDGED SWORD
Thus, almost invariably, the question of the venture firm's lia-
bility will turn on the issue of notice. Although the plaintiff has the
burden of proof,50 the venture firm, as a practical matter, must per-
suade the factfinder that it did not have notice of the underlying
breach of fiduciary duty, and must do so by an affirmative showing
that it did not and could not reasonably have known of the unlawful
conduct. By engaging in the customary due diligence, the venture
firm educates itself on those facts which are at the core of the fac-
tual inquiry attendant to and presented at the trial. By the very act
of engaging in due diligence, the venture firm creates the opportu-
nity for plaintiff's counsel to assert that the venture firm, in spite of
protestations to the contrary, knew or certainly should have known
of the underlying breach of fiduciary duty."'
In effect, the due diligence becomes a two-edged sword. On
one side, it will be used to attack the venture firm on the basis that
the firm had the requisite notice, and indeed was specifically aware
of and anticipated the likely assertion of the plaintiff's claims. On
the other side, however, the venture firm will use due diligence as
the basis for its argument that, in spite of its extensive efforts, it did
not become aware of facts sufficient to put it on actual notice that
there had been a breach of fiduciary duty. It may be difficult, how-
ever, for the firm to establish, whether by testimony or argument,
the fact that its due diligence was both thorough and accurate, and
yet that it did not go so far as to discover the underlying breach of
fiduciary duty.
VII. THE POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS IN OUR PROTOTYPICAL CASE
What, then, might be the arguments of the parties in our proto-
50. See, eg., Nickelson v. General Motors Corp., 361 F.2d 196, 198 (7th Cir. 1966).
See generally JAGER, supra note 1, at § 5.02 and cases cited therein.
51. Whether the venture firm had such knowledge need not be determined based on
direct evidence or the lack thereof, but may be inferred from other facts. See Rohm & Haas
Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., 689 F.2d 424, 430-31 (3d. Cir. 1982).
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typical case? 2 Alphabetics will adopt some or all of the following
themes and present, and accentuate, testimony or documents re-
garding them.
A. The Tortious Conduct of the Former Employees
Alphabetics will assert that the individual defendants, Bob,
Carol and Dan, have acted in bad faith. Any preparatory steps
taken by them will be probed in an effort to show that they were
disloyal. In fact, the trade secret claim is accompanied by a claim
for the breach of a duty of loyalty5" and misappropriation of a cor-
porate opportunity.54 Moreover, Alphabetics will argue that its for-
mer employees developed their expertise and had access to the
underlying technology and market analysis exclusively as a result of
their employment with Alphabetics, that their access to the technol-
ogy and market analysis was given to them on a need-to-know basis,
and that their duty to Alphabetics was commensurate with their
high-level positions, and with their compensation while employed
by Alphabetics. Finally, Alphabetics will assert that Elfspeak is a
mere continuation of the individual defendants' unlawful activity
commenced while they were employed by Alphabetics.
Alphabetics' strategy will be to create an atmosphere in which
the factfinder will conclude that it would be fundamentally unfair, if
not morally wrong, to allow Fantastic Ventures to profit in any way
from its involvement with the remaining defendants. In effect, Al-
phabetics will seek a finding of liability against Fantastic Ventures
in the wake of such a finding against the remaining defendants.
B. Product and Market Information
Alphabetics will assert that it is a pioneer in its field and that
the subject product information and market analysis is not publicly
known.55 The lack of documentation associated with Elfspeak's
52. We will focus only on those arguments which implicate Fantastic Ventures. For a
statement of the elements of a trade secret claim against the primary defendants, see JAGER,
supra note 1, at § 5.04. See also MILGRIM, supra note 1, at § 7.07[1].
53. See, eg., Chelsea Industries, Inc. v. Gaffney, 389 Mass. 1, 449 N.E.2d 320 (1983).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 393 (1957).
54. For the classical statement of the corporate opportunity rule, see Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (1939). Here, Alphabetics will claim that the Elfspeak
product is one which Alphabetics has under consideration, and one that it will likely develop
when market conditions are right. Success of this argument will probably hinge on determi-
nations of witness credibility.
55. The comments to RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) discuss both the definition
of trade secrets and the secrecy requirement. Here, we have assumed that the subject product
and market information is susceptible to trade secret protection.
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product and the fact that Elfspeak's product is not the result of
reverse engineering 6 will draw sharp cross-examination and argu-
ment. Alphabetics will assert that "but for" the disclosure and use
of trade secret and confidential information,57 Elfspeak's "head
start" or "short lead time""8 would not have been achieved. Al-
phabetics will accentuate the fact that the misappropriated informa-
tion has allowed and will continue to allow Elfspeak to avoid costly
and time consuming "dead ends."59 Alphabetics will assert that
Fantastic Ventures knew or should have known that Elfspeak's ef-
forts and ability to develop a product within the schedule set forth
in the term sheet and before the market window of opportunity
closed was based upon a misappropriation of Alphabetics' propriety
information. Alphabetics efforts again are intended to create a cli-
mate for a finding of liability against all the defendants lumped
together.
C. The Status of the Venture Capital Firm
Fantastic Ventures will be cast as a sophisticated investor, ex-
perienced in the area and willing to take risks. In other words, the
company will not be cast as an innocent third party, but as an inte-
gral part of a collective and unlawful effort. Alphabetics will assert
that Fantastic Ventures effectively has control of Elfspeak by virtue
of its domination of the board of directors and dominant sharehold-
ers position. Also, Alphabetics will assert that the time provisions
of the term sheet show that Fantastic Ventures acted positively to
force Elfspeak to rely on Alphabetics information in order to meet
the time deadlines and capture the market opportunity.
56. "Reverse engineering" is simply the independent discovery of trade secret or confi-
dential information achieved through the dissection and inspection of a product lawfully ac-
quired and not subject to an express or implied obligation to maintain confidence. See UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 541 commissioner's comment (1979).
57. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939) provides:
One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest, procures by
improper means information about another's business is liable to the other for
the harm caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information.
Comment (b) to section 759 states that the principles thereof apply to information about
one's business whether or not that information constitutes a trade secret.
58. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 144
(9th Cir. 1965); Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1968).
59. See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1978) per curiam, cert. dis-
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (liability imposed for development cost savings with respect to
product not marketed).
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D. Using Due Diligence Offensively
Alphabetics will assert that "but for" the disclosure and in-
tended use of the trade secret and confidential information, Fantas-
tic Ventures would not have invested in Elfspeak, and Bob, Carol
and Dan, through Elfspeak, would not have been able to compete
with it. Alphabetics need not prove the causal link between the dis-
closure or use and the investment, however, because as against Fan-
tastic Ventures, Alphabetics is only required to show that Fantastic
Ventures had notice that such disclosure or use constituted a breach
of fiduciary duty. 0
Focusing specifically on Fantastic Ventures' due diligence, Al-
phabetics will argue that Fantastic should not be permitted to hide
behind the advice of its counsel.61 The due diligence was con-
ducted, if not directly under the guidance and assistance of Fantas-
tic Ventures' counsel, then certainly with its counsel's knowledge
and approval.62 The focus of the due diligence was on the very sub-
ject of the litigation, namely, any possible breaches of confidence.
Alphabetics will support its assertions by presenting its own expert
on the purpose, nature and extent of due diligence in the industry.
Alphabeties will also point out that the overwhelming industry
practice is to make software packages available only upon the exe-
cution of an appropriate license agreement or other pledges of confi-
60. Query: Is the investment by Fantastic Ventures (i) "use" of the trade secrets within
the meaning of the RSrATEMENT OF TORTS § 757; and (ii) "substantial assistance" within
the meaning of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876? Alternatively, is disclosure
of information to Fantastic Ventures sufficient "use" by Bob, Carol and Dan to support relief,
if the court ultimately finds that Fantastic Ventures' investment was based not on that disclo-
sure, but on information independently developed in Fantastic Ventures' due diligence?
61. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the potential liability of professionals
such as lawyers, accountants and other consultants who work with the venture capital firm as
part of its due diligence effort. In Koehler v. Pulvers, 606 F. Supp. 164, 171 (S.D. Cal. 1985),
however, the court determined that an attorney who helped draft a prospectus may be liable
as an aider and abetter if he knew that those for whom he worked were committing a fraud
and he substantially aided the overall enterprise, citing Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d
1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982).
62. Fantastic Ventures may face a difficult tactical decision if a situation arises at trial
which permits it to invoke the attorney-client privilege. Fantastic Ventures may not want to
disclose confidential communications with its counsel, yet because this is a civil action, the
factfinder may be allowed to draw an adverse inference from Fantastic Ventures' assertion of
the privilege. The law in this area is inconsistent. See MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE § 76
(1954); 8 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 2322 (1940). Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence § 513
would have prohibited any comment by opposing counsel on any inference from the invoca-
tion of the attorney-client privilege. See 2 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 513[2] (1985). For
discussion of the analogous Fifth Amendment issue, see Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle - The
Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L. J. 1062 (1982); Note, Use of the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REV. 322 (1966).
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dentiality.63 Here, Alphabetics will highlight Fantastic Ventures'
understanding of industry practices, both as a consequence of its
prior experience in the industry and as a result of the work of its
consultant. Accordingly, Alphabetics will argue, Fantastic Ven-
tures knew or should have known that virtually all information con-
cerning the Alphabetics' product and its market was considered
proprietary.
E. The Venture Capital Firm's Response
Obviously, Fantastic Ventures wants Elfspeak and its princi-
pals to prevail, because there can be no liability against Fantastic
Ventures without a finding of liability against Bob, Carol, Dan or
Elfspeak. At the same time, Fantastic Ventures will be seriously
concerned with its legal exposure, which may exceed the amount of
money already, invested in Elfspeak. Accordingly, Fantastic Ven-
tures must strike a balance between supporting the primary defend-
ants, Bob, Carol, Dan and Elfspeak, and yet not appearing to stand
too close to them and thereby creating a risk that Fantastic Ven-
tures will be lumped together with the primary defendants in the
case of a finding of liability against them. The appropriate balance
is difficult to strike. At a minimum, Fantastic Ventures should have
separate counsel. Its counsel will be faced with several tactical deci-
sions in trying to achieve the appropriate balance. For example,
should Fantastic Ventures' counsel cross-examine Alphabetics' wit-
nesses who testify only on issues implicating the primary defend-
ants? In addition, should Fantastic Ventures' counsel introduce or
comment on, in his or her opening statement and closing argument,
evidence not directed toward the secondary liability of Fantastic
Ventures?
Fantastic Ventures will assert that it relied on the express rep-
resentations of Bob, Carol and Dan that their intended venture
would not place them in violation of any employment or confidenti-
ality agreement, or of any other agreements with Alphabetics.
Fantastic Ventures will also assert that its investments in the new
enterprise were based, in part, on its assessment of the business plan
of the principals of Elfspeak. If Elfspeak's business plan does not
contain any trade secret or confidential information, Fantastic will
63. See Warrington Associates, Inc. v. Real-Time Engineering Systems, Inc., 522 F.
Supp. 367, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
64. This point may also cut both ways; Alphabetics will argue that the representation
was sought precisely because Fantastic Ventures was on notice of the likelihood of wrongdo-
ing by the principals. Press reports concerning recent litigation between two major oil com-
panies suggest that a similar argument was highly persuasive to the jury.
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accentuate that fact. Of course, if Elfspeak's business plan does
contain such information, then Fantastic Ventures must show, in a
real sense, that it did not understand, or have notice of the fact, that
the information was of a trade secret or confidential nature. It may
be difficult for Fantastic Ventures to prevail on such an assertion
while simultaneously defending the quality of its due diligence.
Fantastic Ventures will accentuate the fact that Bob, Carol and
Dan took no documents with them and necessarily delivered no
documents reflecting trade secrets or confidential information to it.
It makes no difference, however, as a matter of law, whether the
information was taken in the form of documentation or merely
taken in the heads of the former employees and thereafter disclosed
or used, particularly where, as here, the founders did not need doc-
umentation in order to carry away the trade secret and confidential
information.
Fantastic Ventures will attempt to show that its investment in
the new company was based in substantial part on its determination
that the principals were extremely competent and that their general
knowledge, experience and skill in the relevant market would en-
sure the success of the enterprise. The argument will be difficult,
however, because Elfspeak intends to market a specific product in a
specific market. The information regarding the product and the
market is precisely the information which Alphabetics will assert is
trade secret and/or confidential.
Fantastic Ventures will further claim that its decision to invest
in Elfspeak was the result of its due diligence, which yielded no
incriminating facts, and not, as Alphabetics contends, as the result
of Fantastic Ventures' calculated gamble to take advantage of trade
secret and confidential information which it knew or should have
known was misappropriated.65 Fantastic Ventures may present evi-
dence regarding its duty to its investors, which requires that the
principals of Fantastic Ventures not unnecessarily and unreasona-
bly expose its investors' capital to legal risk. Alphabetics will rejoin
by asserting that venture capital firms and their investors are pri-
marily engaged in high risk ventures. In addition, the enormous
65. Fantastic Ventures' use of an independent consultant in its due diligence will pro-
vide an opportunity for Fantastic Ventures to show that its consultant did not uncover infor-
mation which led him or her to conclude that the proposed product development must be
based on misappropriated information. Alphabetics, however, can rejoin by arguing that the
independent consultant's superior knowledge of industry standards and existing and potential
market conditions should be imputed to Fantastic Ventures so as to put it on notice of a
breach of fiduciary duty. If the factfinder concludes that there was in fact a misappropria-
tion, it is difficult to see how Fantastic Ventures' argument can prevail.
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potential return from Elfspeak's venture justifies any risk, financial
or legal, attendant to Fantastic Ventures' investment.
Fantastic Ventures may also rely on industry standards regard-
ing due diligence. It can show what other venture capital firms do
and how its due diligence was consistent with the industry standard.
The difficulty with this argument is that the industry standard in-
cludes important elements of due diligence which are specifically
directed at possible adverse legal consequences resulting from the
intended investment. These adverse legal consequences are focused
primarily on the potential liability of the new company and its prin-
cipals for misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential
information.
Fantastic Ventures' prospects of avoiding liability may depend
in large measure on its ability to rebut Alphabetics' allegations that
it was a joint or contributing tortfeasor or liable as an aider and
abettor because Fantastic Ventures knew or should have known of
the breach of the underlying fiduciary duty. The factfinder's deter-
mination in this regard, however, may depend on the factfinder's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. For example, Gopher
will testify on behalf of Fantastic Ventures that he did not know66
that Bob, Carol and Dan may have violated their fiduciary duty to
Alphabetics.67 In spite of Gopher's direct testimony, however, the
factfinder may determine that Gopher, and therefore Fantastic Ven-
tures, knew or should have known of the breach as the result of
Fantastic Ventures' due diligence. Unfortunately, there may not
have been any alternative way in which Fantastic Ventures could
have structured the transaction or conducted its due diligence so as
to avoid this dilemma.68
66. Gopher can testify to his knowledge, intent and state of mind as the general partner
of Fantastic Ventures. See 2 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 581 (1940) (practically universal
disapproval of the view that a person, especially a party, should be disqualified from testifying
as to his own intent or motive even where that intent or motive is material to the investiga-
tion). Of course, Gopher's testimony may not be believed by the factfinder.
67. Query: Can Fantastic Ventures claim that although it may have had knowledge of
the facts which ultimately are determined to be sufficient to afford trade secret protection to
Alphabetics' information, it did not know that use or disclosure of such information by Bob,
Carol and Dan would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty? In short, is Fantastic Ventures
required at its peril to anticipate the factfinder's ultimate conclusion? Although this question
may seem to provide a convenient solution to the problem, resolution in favor of Fantastic
Ventures would appear inconsistent with basic principles applied to litigants in other situa-
tions. For example, the inability to predict a factfinder's determination in a "business judg-
ment" case has not been thought to relieve a director of his/her potential liability.
68. Had Fantastic Ventures sought and received agreements from Bob, Carol and Dan
requiring indemnification of Fantastic Ventures in the event of litigation, those agreements
might be used as evidence that Fantastic Ventures knew that the Elfspeak venture involved
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VIII. RECOMMENDED LEGAL STANDARD
The most appropriate legal standard to be applied in these sit-
uations is one that requires either knowing participation by the ven-
ture capital firm in the breach of the underlying fiduciary duty
sufficient to find liability as a joint or contributing tortfeasor, or, on
an aiding and abetting theory, actual knowledge on the part of the
venture capital firm that such a duty is being violated. Investments
by venture capital firms may be essential to either the growth or
continued vitality of regional economies. To the extent that courts
use a less than knowing participation or actual knowledge standard,
there necessarily will be a substantial chilling effect on investments
by venture capital firms in situations like these.
Despite the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure69 and comparable state court rules, there appears to
be increasing resort to so-called "tactical law suits"70 in which a
company sues its former employee in order to stifle, in large mea-
sure, any further investment in the new venture and thereby inhibit
competition.71 On a lesser standard than that recommended here,
unlawful conduct. Counsel should consider whether this evidentiary risk outweighs the value
of such agreements, especially where the indemnitors' financial positions make meaningful
indemnification payments unlikely.
69. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowl-
edge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
Rule 11 also provides for sanctions against the attorney, his client or both where the rule is
violated.
70. Defined broadly, "tactical law suits" include both those actions in which proprie-
tary rights violations are asserted in bad faith, and those actions where serious questions of
the advisability and appropriateness of litigation have been resolved in favor of proceeding
with litigation because of the impact of the mere pendency of the action. For example, the
pendency of the litigation might inhibit any further investment in the new venture by venture
capitalists; might have a chilling effect on the willingness of vendors and other third parties to
enter into business relationships with the new venture; and might seriously impair the ability
of the new venture to make the customary warranties and representations in the marketplace
regarding its ownership and right to use the underlying technology. In addition, the pen-
dency of an action may have an in terrorem effect on existing employees of the plaintiff who
might be entertaining thoughts of leaving and founding competitive enterprises. Finally, in
cases where the departure of key employees from the plaintiff has been highly publicized, the
filing of litigation might stabilize the stock price and otherwise afford the plaintiff's stockhold-
ers some comfort in knowing that the plaintiff is vigorously pursuing its legal rights.
71. Although a defendant may assert counterclaims in response to a tactical law suit in
appropriate circumstances, such counterclaims are difficult to prove because the means used
to inhibit competition is the litigation itself, and the plaintiff has a First Amendment interest
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venture capital firms would have greater exposure to such suits. In
addition, venture firms might decline to pursue investment opportu-
nities because the cost of due diligence may become prohibitive in
light of the potential legal exposure.
Moreover, a possessor of trade secrets or confidential informa-
tion is in most instances, protected against misappropriation of such
information. Where a misappropriation of trade secrets is proved,
the plaintiff can show that it is entitled to appropriate monetary
and/or injunctive relief against the former employees and the new
venture.72 By using the recommended legal standard, plaintiffs, in
some situations, may prove liability against the primary defendants,
but may be unable to prove liability against a venture capital firm
and thereby will be deprived of an opportunity to collect on a mone-
tary judgment against a defendant able to satisfy the judgment.
Otherwise, the plaintiff is protected. We suggest that the availabil-
ity of an additional "deep pocket" recovery is not necessary to give
adequate protection to trade secret plaintiffs, and that the argu-
ments in favor of broadening such recoveries are outweighed by the
potential inhibiting effect on venture capital financings.
In addition, to the extent that the former employer wants to
limit competition by its former employees, it can enter into cove-
nants not to compete with its employees. Covenants not to com-
pete, if they are reasonable in time, territory and activity enjoined,
are generally enforceable.73
in free access to the courts. See, eg., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965) (patent infringement suit brought in bad faith
with an intent to restrain competition or monopolize). See also CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Com-
pany, 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985) (proper balance between the antitrust laws and trade
secret law is achieved by requiring an antitrust plaintiff to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant asserted trade secrets with knowledge that no trade secrets ex-
isted); Fleming Sales Co., Inc. v. Bailey, No. 83 C 7028, (N.D. Ill. May 24, 1985) (sequence of
events regarding the plaintiff's prosecution of the litigation must be viewed as reflecting bad
faith and justifying the imposition of defendant's attorneys' fees under FED. R. CIv. P. 11).
72. In a trade secrets case, a successful plaintiff can be awarded damages in the nature
of lost profits, an accounting of the defendant's profits or the imposition of a reasonable
royalty. See generally MILGRIM, supra note 1, at § 7.08[3]; JAGER, supra note 1, at § 7.01. In
addition, courts often use their creative equitable power in fashioning appropriate injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 649, 359 N.E.2d
804, 806 (1976). Courts can also specifically enforce express covenants not to disclose trade
secrets or confidential information. See Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates,
Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. S. Ct. 1979).
73. See MILGRIM, supra note 1, at § 2.09[7][ii]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 188 (1973); see also Fleming Sales Co., Inc. v. Bailey, supra note 71 (an employer
worried that the skills and knowledge acquired by an employee during the course of employ-
ment will give him or her an undue competitive advantage may guard its interests by use of a
restrictive covenant).
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The policy rationale reflected in the securities law cases applies
with equal force in these situations.74 To impose secondary aiding
and abetting liability without actual knowledge of wrongful purpose
may unreasonably expose venture firms to liability and, as pointed
out in the Woodward case,75 may make the venture captial firm an
insurer regarding the conduct of companies in which they invest.
Arguably, the former employer would merely be required to prove a
breach of fiduciary duty by its former employees and assistance by
the venture firm in the form of its investment.
The actual knowledge standard also reflects the reality of fi-
nancing high technology start-up companies. In most situations,
the founders of a new venture have taken permissible preparatory
steps while still in their prior employment.76 Once they terminate
their employment, they must move quickly to capitalize on their
product concept and market opportunity. The venture firm con-
ducts its due diligence speedily, discreetly and in a manner which
minimizes the chance that the founders' business plans will be dis-
closed to third parties, including the founders' former employer.
The venture firm should not be forced, in effect, to contact the for-
mer employer as part of its due diligence to determine whether the
former employer contends or will contend that the new venture's
business will result in a breach of the former employee's fiduciary
duty and thereby precipitate litigation. The former employer would
want to know the nature of the new venture's product and its antici-
pated marketing methods in order to respond to the venture firm's
inquiry. Any disclosure along those lines certainly diminishes the
new venture's actual or potential competitive advantage. The for-
mer employer simply may take business measures to forestall or
block effective competition. At a minimum, the former employer
could withhold its approval or, if the situation so warrants, hold out
the threat of litigation until it has more information which it can
verify. Even the most forthcoming former employer would be re-
luctant to waive claims it may have in light of what necessarily will
be a minimal disclosure. Certainly counsel for the former employer
would almost always recommend against any statement in the na-
ture of a waiver, however qualified.
For the foregoing reasons, courts faced with claims against
venture capital firms which have funded start-up companies should
apply the generally recognized standards associated with joint
74. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
75. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1957).
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tortfeasor or contributing tortfeasor liability, and, with respect to
secondary liability as an aider and abettor, the actual knowledge
standard that has found favor in the securities law cases.

